EXECUTIVE PO'VVER: THE LAST THIRTY YEARS
GL ENN SUUv! ASY*

1.

i NTRODUCTION

The las t thirty yeC\rs have witnessed a continued growth in
ex ecutive power-with virtu all y no check by the legislativ e branch.
Regardless of which politi cC\l pMty contr ols the Congress, the
institution of the executiv e continues to grow and increase in
power- p ar ticularly in the foreign affairs arena. While to many,
the end of the Bush admini stration signaled the end of a perceived
"power grab" by the executive branch, nothing could be further
from the truth. This short Article will assert that since the
founding of this journal thirty years ago, the United States ha s
witnessed several changes that have inevitably led to this rapid
expansion of executive power. Section 2 will discuss the Founders'
intention that the exec utiv e be supreme in the arena of for eign
affairs. Section 3 will explore executive power in the twenty-first
century, particularly since 9/11 when the vast increases in
technology and the ability to inflict n1assive harm in an instant
(often by non-state ac tors) has necessi tated a. more aggressive,
centralized decisionma.king process within the power of the
executive. Additionally, the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the
Congress have crippled its a bility to actually "check" the executive,
for fear of being p erceiv ed as "soft on terror" or "vvea.k on
defense." With these considerations, this Article reconm1ends that
President Ba.rack Obama continue to protect his executive
prerogatives as the best m ea ns of promoting national security in
the twenty-first century.
Unfortunately, the real danger is not necessarily the
understandable growth in executive power- it is that for eign
affairs and wartime decisionmaking is going uncl1ecked by the
Congress and is increasingly in the hands of the federal courts and
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unelec ted/ life tenured judges and justices -- som e thing the
Founding Fa thers would have not, and could have not, ever
anticipated.
2.

TH E EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE FOUNDING

The his tory of the power of the executive in the area of foreign
affairs, and military operations in particu lar, is abundant with
exan1ples of the Founders' intent.
Their intent, partially in
resp onse to the failures of the Articles of Confedera tion, placed the
Commander-in-Chief pow ers clearly in the Constitution- within
Article II.
One wa y to discern the Founders' intent on foreign affairs is
through the lens of the m eaning of executive power at the time of
the creation of the Constitution. In the eighteenth century meaning
of the terrn, executive power clearly included th e for eign affairs
power as well as the power to execute the laws within the domestic
United States . Thus, the Founders, aware of the failur es of the
Articles of Confederation in foreign affairs, military affairs, and the
execution of laws, sought to remedy these probl ems by vesting
such power in the Presidency.
Some scholars and policy makers toda y, when reviewing the
pre-revolutionary period and the revolutionary p eriod itself, argue
the Founders were rejecting the crown and intend ed the legislature
to be the s trongest branch. In some areas this is true- particularly
with regard to domestic affairs. However, these critics, such as my
fri end Lou Fisher, rely upon the strength of the legislatures during
this period as indicia the Founders wanted the legislature to be coequal- or in many ways, superior to the executive in the foreign
affairs reaJm .1 However, I would suggest m y learned colleagues
misinterpret the actual intent of the Founders. The legisla tures, the
Continental Congress, and the state legislatures for the most p art
were functioning as the "executive branch."
Prior to the
Constitution, there was no real executive branch in existence, and
thu s, the '/ executive powers// in foreign affairs were v es ted in the
legislatures. Ev en the great Chief Ju stice John Marshall later
described it: "[t]he confederation was, essentiall y, a league; and
congress was a corps of ambassadors, to be recalled at the will of

Louis Fisher, Militnry Com111ission s: Probiems of Au thority nnd Pmctice, 24 B.U.
(2006) (describing the relatively expansi ve powers of Congress
over military and forei gn affairs during th e pre-revolutionZtry period).
1
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their masters ." 2 Jack Rakove, a leading scholar today on th e
Founders, notes that many Am.ericans during this p eriod actually
referred to the legislature as the "Supreme Executive" and th e
"Supreme Executive Council." 3 Rakove has further noted "the ide a
that Congress was essentially an executive body persisted beca u se
its principal functi ons, w ar and diplomacy, w ere traditi onally
associated with the Crown, whose executive, political preroga tives,
bear a very s triking resemblance to the powers of Congr es s . " ·~ The
failures of this framework, however, led the leading thinkers of the
d ay to reject this notion, and to create an executive bran ch to be the
Command er-in-Chief and the sole person to conduct the nation' s
for eign affairs. The Con stitution once enacted, rejected the theories
that tb e United States could function effici ently without an
executive.
Mos t scholars look to Alexander Hamilton, the m os t ardent
supporter of a strong executive, for guidance when researching the
original intent of executive power within the U.S. Constitution.s
H e is well known to have sought an aggressive executive branch to
m ee t the needs of foreign affairs and warfare. However, as
Professor Michael Ramsey has written, even the era's lea ding
legislative champion, Thomas Jefferson, saw the n eed to have an
energetic executive.6 Jefferson said, "The Constitution has declared
the Executive powers shall be vested in the President. The
transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether.
It belongs then to the h ea d of that department, except as to s uch
portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate." 7 Although
not a Framer, per se, one clearly would not rely on him exclusively
for discerning intent of the period. It is, however, important to
note the leading anti-federalis ts of this nascent p eriod of the United
States also agreed with this n o tion of the dominance of the
executive in fo reign affairs, thus, helping better argu e and
articulate the original m eaning and intent of the Frame rs during
2 }OHN Yoo, TH E POWE
RS Of W 1\R AND PEACE: THE CONS
TTI TU ION Al'\ D FOREIGN
SAFFAIR AFTER 9/11 73-74 (2005).
3 JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINN
L TICS
OING
S OF NATI NA POLI
383 (1979).
l Id. (in te rna l citations om itted).
THE FED ERA L.lST No. 74 (Alexander Ha milton).
{) Sec, Michael D. Ramsey, T11 e Text
sisua
l Ba
of the President's Foreign Aj)i1irs
Power, 30 H arv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y '141, 141 (2006) (noting that Thomas je ffe rson
advoca ted for an execu ti ve that had the p ower to execute laws and manage
foreign relations).
7 [d.
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this period. It is reasonable to assert that if Hamilton and Je fferson
agreed on this issue (possibly the only question upon which they
trul y agreed in the ea rly 1800s) - s trong executi ve power may be
reasonably understood to be the intent of the Framers.
The Framers a lso looked long and hard at certain state
gov ernments during the Revolutionary p eriod to detenT'Iine how
best to create an effective executi ve. H amilton particularly relied
upon the state of New York in drafting the Constitution. In fact,
Go vernor George Clinton maintained a strong executive
throughout the 1770s and 1780s. The Framers co nsid ere d New
York to be the most s table colony durin g this era. Of importance,
the New York Constitution, adopted in 1777, veste d the Governor
with the position of "general and comn1ander-in-chief of all the
militia and admiral of the navy of the State."tJ Clinton exercised his
unila teral and unitary p ower by sending troops to reinforce
General Gates' efforts against the British. He only let the state
legisla ture know of his actions several m onths later. The strength
of the New York Constitution and government s trongly influenced
New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts when they
crea ted their own s tate Constitutions as well.
The Framers took the New York example to heart when
drafting the federal Constitution in Philadelphia. They created an
ind ependent, energetic executive empowered w ith the robust
authority to engage in foreign affairs, and conduct war.
Additionally, they were strongly influenced by the enlightened
thinkers of the da y. Although popular culture often refers to John
Locke as the most influential, in reality William Blackstone was by
far the mo st widely read and influ ential political writer in America
during the founding period.
Jam es Madison described
Blackstone's Commentaries as "a book which is in everv man's
hand"9 and described Montesquieu as "the oracle who is always
consulted and cited on the separati on of powers."lll
Both
Blackstone and Montesquieu d efined the ex ecu tive powers to
include for eign affairs. This area of foreign affairs, and most
importantl y carrying out warfare operations, was vested in the
executive to ensure speed, flexibility, and dis patch.
0

N.Y. CONSTITUTIONof 1777, art. XVTTI (1777).
Y Virginia Ratify ing Convention: Jun e 18, 1788, http: / /wvvw.constitution.org
jrc/rat_va_15. htm (l as t v isi ted Mar. 1, 2009) .
111 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J ames Madi son).
S
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For exa mpl e, Montesquieu wrote, the executi ve "makes peace
or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the p ublic security,
and provides against invasions." 11 In m ilitary affairs, Montesquieu
argu ed that the executive sho uld possess exclusive control over the
arn1y . H e wrote, "[o]nce an army is es tabli shed, it oug ht not to
depend immediately on the legisla ti ve, but on the executive p ower;
and this fron1 the very nature of the thing, its business co nsisting
more o f ac tion than in delibera tion -"t 2 Again, the legisla ture
retained the power of the purse as it d oes today an d the ability to
termina te the authorizati on of the army. In the days of the
stan ding army this p ow er was significant and could. be anal ogized
today to c-1 uthoriza
s tion to conduct military o perati ons.
Simil arlv, Blackstone in his Com men taries on the Laws of
En gland declared the conduct of foreign affairs to be a
quintessentially executive function. He de fend ed the Crown' s
authority in this area by decl aring, " [t]he King h as the sole
prerogati ve in making war and p eace ... it vvould indeed be
impro per that any number of subjec ts shoul d ha ve the power of
binding the supreme magistrate, and p utting him against his will
in a state of war." 13 Certainly, this can be ana logize d to the various
issu es confronting our nation toda y as o ur armed forces are
com mitted to fi ghting two wars. He fur ther declared the King to
be the "generalissimo
,
or the firs t in military command, w ithin the
kingdom."H
These statements offer glimpses into the most
influential thinkers of the era and give u s a real conce pt of the
thinking of our founding fathers as they debated how to create the
executive branch .
Beyond this understanding, w e n eed to look at this power from
a functional perspective.
President George Washington
understo od his role; having overseen the entire Conv ention, and
upo n taking office, he immediate ly ass umed the duties of
Commander-in-Chief and the lead er in foreign affairs. Vlithout
any statutory authority, h e exercised the fo reign affairs functions
that were n o t specifically mentioned in the Co nstitution,
operations su ch as control and rem oval of diplomats, fore ign
0

Yoo, sup m n o te 2, at 39 (internal c it<1tion s o mi tted ).
Jd. at 41 (quo tin g 2 CH ARLES DE MOi'-.i"tESQUI EU , T HE
(Tho mas N ugent tr<1ns. 1949) (1748) .
13 Jd. at 41 (quo ting WlLL!AiVI B LACKSTONE
, C ARY
OMM ENT
ENGLA ND 249 (1830)).
14 Id. at 41.
11
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communica tions, and form.ation of for eign policy. These powers
w ere previou sly exercised by the Congress during the p eriod of the
Articl es of Confed eration and the n ew Congress certainly a ppeared
to understand these powers had now shifted to the Presidency.
There is no evid ence that anyone in Con gress protes ted these
acti ons, form ally or informally. Thus, d e facto, it a ppears to h ave
been understood by the n ew government that the auth ority for
for eign affairs and warfare became the sole provin ce of the
executive.
Also, Hamilton, in the Pac~fi cus essays, dea ling with
Washington's proclamation of n eutrality, noted this authority was
sirTtply part of the traditional executiv e power over for eign affairs;
this power w as ves ted in Article II of the Cons titution, and not
granted to any other branch of government. His argu ments arc
n ow well known to l1ave carried the d ay. But it should be m ade
clear these were not isolated proclamations by the genius
Hamilton.
Other prominent leaders of the 1790s, including
Madison, John Ja y, Oliver Ellsworth, John Marsh all, and President
Washington, similarly described foreign affairs powers as
executive in nature.
The ex treme of foreign affairs- armed conflict- was clearl y
intended to be embodied w ithin the executive branch. Blackstone,
Montesquieu, the Federalist Papers, affirmations by the leaders of
the day, as well as the conduct of the first president himself leaves
little room to doubt the Founders' intentions in this arena. Again,
this is not to say Congress has no role whatsoever. That is simply
not the case. Congress has the power to declare war, and during
combat operation s the right to refuse to fund the war. Once
warfare begins, h owever, it appears the need for r apid action
necessitates a shift in the careful b alancin g act be tween executive
and legislative power to the executive branch. The War on al
Qaeda, h owever- with an enemy that d oes n o t wear a u niform,
provides n o institution wi th which to ne go tiate, fl outs the laws of
vvar, and whose membership is spread across over fifty nation
states makes the n eed for dispatch more important than in prior
conflicts.
Of note, the d evelopment and intellec tual strength inv ested in
crea ting a s trong executive in for eign affairs and during periods of
armed conflict was well-esta blished before the Constitution limited
the term of a President to a maximum of eight years. 15 Since that
15

U. 5. CONST. amend XXII.
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am endment, regardless of the power exercised as President, no
matter what happens, in fo ur to eight years, an executive will be
removed. As a result, the elec torate can have reduced concerns
(since 1951, ·when the Twenty-Second A mendment was ratified)
about excessive executive p ovver by a President w ho might
otherw ise run for nml tiple term.s. As a result, an "imperial
presidency" is now firml y out of the realm of possibility. Thus,
again, any accusa tions of an imperial presid ency, or executive
power gra bs, or o ther references to tyrannical government asserted
by some critics (pa rticularly critics of President George W. Bush),
appear hyperbolic within our exis ting Republic.
3.

E XECUTI VE POvVER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The latter half of the twentie th cen tury w itnessed increas ing
concern about th e powe r of the execu ti ve to engage in co1T1bat
operations with ou t any input from Congress. The Vietnam War
prompted Congress to en act the War Powers Resolution req uiring
the President to n o ti.fy Congress if employing troops for longer
than sixty to ninety days in any zone o f combat. 16 Unfortunately,
however, Congress has never fully asserted its con stitutional,
sta tutorily-empowered role in "checking" the executive with this
power.
Since the attacks of 9/ 11, the original concerns noted by
Hamilton, Jay, and Madison have been heightened. Never be fore
in the young history of the United States h as the need for an
energetic executive been more vital to its national security. The
need for quick ac ti on in this arena requires an execu tive
response - particularly when fighting a shadowy enemy like al
Qaeda-not the delibera tive bodies opining on w hat and how to
conduct warfare or d eterminin g how and when to respond. The
threats from n on-state actors, such as al Qaeda, make the n eed for
dispatch and rapid respon se even greater. Jefferson's concerns
abo ut the slow and de liberative institution of Congress b eing
prone to informational lea ks are even more rel ev ant in the tw entyfirst century. The ad vent of the twenty-four h our media only lea ds
to an increase d need for retaining enhanced levels of executive

16 War Po wers Resol uti on of 1973, Pu b. L. No . 93-1 48, § 5, 87 Stat. 555, 557.
The Con gress has truly only asserted its au thority und er this la w once regarding
troops being assigned in Beirut. See Multinational Force in Lebanon, Pub. L. No.
98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983) (authori zing the use of force in Lebanon under the
au thority of the War Power
s Resolution Act).
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control of foreign policy. This is particularly true in modern
warfare. In the war on international terror, intelligence is vital to
ongoing operations and successful prevention of attac ks. Al Qaeda
now has both the will and the ability to strike with the equivalent
force and might of a nation's arn1ed forces. The need to identify
these individuals before they can operationalize an attack is vital.
Often international terror cells consist of only a small number of
individuals -making intelligence that much more difficult to
obtain and even more vital than in previous conflicts. The normal
movements of tanks, ships, and aircrafts that, in traditional armed
conflict are indicia of a pending attack are not the case in the
current '/fourth generation" war. Thus, the need for intelligence
becomes an even greater concern for the commanders in the field
as well as the Commander-in-Chief.
Supporting a strong executive in foreign affairs does not
necessarily mean the legislature has no role at all. In fact, their
dominance in domestic affairs rem.ains strong.
Additionally,
besides the traditional roles identified in the Constitution for the
legislature in foreign affairs- declaring war, ratifying treaties,
overseeing appointments of ambassadors, etc.- this growth of
executive power now, more than ever, necessitates an enhanced,
professional, and apolitical oversight of the executive. An active,
aggressive oversight of foreign affairs, and warfare in particular,
by the legislature is now critical. Unfortunately, the United
States- particularly over the past decade- has witnessed a
legislature unable to muster the political will necessary to
adequately oversee, let alone check, the executive branch's
growing power. Examples are abundant: lack of enforcement of
the War Powers Resolution abound the executive's unchecked
invasions of Grenada, Panama, and Kosovo, and such assertions as
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, the USA Patriot
Act, military commissions, and the updated Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act CFISA") . There have been numerous grandstanding complaints registered in the media and hearings over
most, if not all, of these issues. However, in each case, the
legislature has all but abdicated their constitution a lly mandated
role and allowed the judicial branch to serve as the only real check
on alleged excesses of the executive branch. This deference is
particularly dangerous and, in the current enviromnent of foreign
affairs and warfare, tends to unintentionally politicize the Court.
The Founders clearly intended the political branches to best
serve the citizenry by functioning as the dominant forces in
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guiding the nation's foreign affairs. They ha d a nticipa ted the
politicC1l sbra nche to struggle over who has primacy in this arena.
In doing so, they had hoped n ei ther branch vvould becom e too
strong. The com.mon theme articu lated by Madison , am bition
co unters ;:ur:bition,ll intend ed foreign affairs to be a "give and
take" be tween the executive and legisla tive branch es. However,
in actio n by the legislative branch on m yriad policy a nd legal issues
surroundin \?; the "vvar on terror" h as forced the J· udicia rv
to fulfill
'
the function of questioning, di sagreeing, and "check ing" the
executi
ve
in areas such as wartime policv, detentions a t
G uanno
ta nar
Bay, and tactics and strategy of intelli gence
co llection . The unique nature of the conflict agains t international
ter ror cre0tes 111 .:11w
e ar as where law and lnolicv arc m ixed. The
ac tions by the Bush adminis tration , in particular, led to outcries
fro m manv on the left about his intentions a nd desire to
-·
unconsti tutiona lly increase the p ower of the Presidenc y. Yet, the
Congress never firm ly exercised the "check" on the executive in
any for mal rnc:mner w ha tsoever.
For examp le, many policym akers disagreed wi th the p ower
given to the President within the Authorization to Use Military
Force (" AUMF") .1S Arguably, this legisla tio n w as broad in scope,
and po tenti ally granted sweeping powers to the Presi dent to wage
the "war on terror." However, Congress cou ld h ave amended or
withdrawn significant portions of the powers it gave to the
executive branch. This lack of withdrawal or amendment may
have been un ders tand a ble when Republicans controlled Congress,
but as of November 2006, the Democrats gained control of both
hou ses of the Congress. Still, other than arguing strongly against
the Presid ent, the legislature did not n ecessaril y or aggr essively act
on its con cerns. Presumably this inaction w as out of concern for
being label ed " soft on terror" or "weak on national securit dy" an
thereby potentially suffering at the ballot box.
Thi s vir tual
paralysis is understand able but again, the p oli tical branches w ere,
and remain, the trues t voice of the people an d pro vide the m eans
to best represent the country's beliefs, interes ts, ar1d national will
in th e arena of foreign affairs. It has been this way in the past but
the rnore recent (certainly over the past thirty years and even more
so in th e past d ecade) intrusions of the judicial branch into w hat
\...

0

17

0

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).

!o A uthorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.

224 (2001) .
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was intended to be a " tug and pull" be tvv een the political bran ches
ca n properly be labeled as an unintend ed consequence of the lack
of any real legislative oversight of the executive branch.
Unfortunately, now nine unelected, life-tenured justices are
d eeply invol ved in war time policy decision making. Exampl es of
judicial policy involvement in fore ign affa irs are abundant
including Rasu l v. Bush;I9 Hamdi v. R ulll~{e ld;20 Hallldan v . Runzsfeld;21
as we ll as last June's Boumediene v . Bu s/1 22 dec ision by the Suprem e
Court, all irnpacting war policy and interpre ta tion of U. 5. treaty
obliga tions. Simply, judges should not pres umptively irTtpact
wa.rfa rc operations or policies nor sho uld thi s become acceptab le
pra.ctice. Without ques tion, over the tp<!S thirty y ears, this is the
most dramatic change in executive p ower. It is not necessarily the
Presid
that is the change we should be
s trength of the ency
concerned about- the ins titutional search fo r enhanced po wer was
anticipated by the Founders - but they intended for Con gress to
check
thi s
executive
tendency
w henever
appropria te.
U nfortuna.tely, this simply is not occurring in twenty-first century
politics. Thus, the danger does not necessa rily lie with the n a tural
d esire for Presidents to increase their power. The real danger is the
judicial branch being forced, or compe lled, to fulfill the
co nstitutionally mandated role of the Congress in checking the
executive.
4.

PRESIDENT OBAMA A ND EXEC UTIVE POWER

The Bush presidency was, and continues to be, criticized for
h aving a standing agenda of increasing th e power of the executi ve
branch during its eight-year tenure. Num erou s articles and books
have been dedicated to discussing these aUega tions. 23 However, as
argued earlier, the reality is that it is a n atural bureaucratic
tend ency, and one of th e Founders prescien tly anticipated, that
each branch would seek greater powers whenever and wherever
possible. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent,
technology and arm am ent become 1nore sophisticated, and w ith
:q Rasul v. Bu sh, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
2ll
21
22
2J

1--!amcli v . Rum sfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (200-l).
Hamdan v. Rum sfeld , 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Boumedienc v. Bush, 553 U.S._ (2008)
See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAK EOVER:

T HE RETURN

PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERI CAN DPv!OCRACY

of the more current criticism).
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the rise of twenty-first century n on-state actors, the need for stron g
exec utive p ower is not only preferred, but also necessary.
Exec utive p ower in the current world dynamic is something,
rega rdless of policy preference or political persu as ions, that the
new President m.ust m aintain in order to best fulfill his
cons titutional rol e of prov iding for the n a tion' s security. This is
simply part of the reality of executive power in the twenty-first
c e n t ur y.2 ~

In his flrs t months in office, President Oba ma has surpri se d
some by embracin g severa l aspects of wha t many v iewed as efforts
by President Bush to uncon stitutionally broaden executi ve povve r.
Spec ificall y, th e O bama Ju stice Department and White H o use
lawyers have sid ed w ith Bush on preventing disclosure of White
Hou se reco rds; tl1ey have invoked the much mali gned Sta te Secrets
Doctrine on a t leas t three different occasions (in a suit o ver th e
extraordinary rend ition program; in a suit on w ire tappin g issu es;
and also in a suit brought by the citizens asserting their
cons titutional rights w ere violated by the teleco mmunications
companies); supported the Bush p olicies r egardin g detain ees when
the O bama Justice Department filed a legal brief maintaining the
d etainees in Afghanistan do not have constitutional rights even
thou gh held at an air base in Bagram; as well as on immigration
where the n ew administration also supported doing workplace
raids targeting illegal immigrants. 25
Unlike the critics of these policies, I believe it is natural for an
The Obama
executive to assert its power in these arenas.
administra tion, as its predecessors - both Democrat and
Republican- hav e all d one they can and sh ould continue to
maintain- or even further expand Presidential p ower within the
arena of foreign affairs. The international situation d emands an
expansive executive power and the Congress is permitting it.
Perhaps an area where the n ew administra tion w ould be pragmatic
and help better atta in an appropriate cons titutional balance is by
ensuring Congress is m ore fully briefed (if even with the Select
Sec Na ncy Bcnac, A mid
, n0/){m
u/ s Clw gc Tlrere's Abo More of tl1e Sil iii C, USA
1vla r.
I,
2009,
nva iltJblc nt
http:/ j w ww.usatod ay .com/ncws
/ was hin g ton / 2009-03-01-obam
asy
("Gle
a_sa m
cN.htm
nn Sulm
... sa id O bam a is
simp ly shi fti ng from ca mpai
g gnin to gove rning. ' It's just the real ities of exec utive
po we r in th e 21s t century,' Sul mas
y said, '\'Vhen
yo u sit dow n and see the threa t
of al-Qa id a an d the threats to na ti onal sec urity and homel and security, this wou ld
be na tural and norm al for him to ta ke such s teps an des.
mea sur "').
25 Id.
2.J

T ClD r\Y,
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Intelligence committees) of actions that could be perceived by
citizens- or even the courts·- as unconstitutional usurpations of
power.
Thirty years ago, there were great concerns about excessive
expansion of executive power by the Nixon administration. In
2009, many of these concerns remain. Just as the end of the Nixon
era did not bring an end of such support of executive power,
transfer of povver fron1 President Bush to President Obama did not
significantly change the role or power of the executive. Indeed, in
his first month as the Commc1nder-in-Chief, and as most students
of history would agree, President Obama not unsurprisingly has
furthered ITtany of the policies the Bush team asserted regarding
executive power.
As a result of the rise of non-state actors such as al Qaeda, the
ubiquity of media coverage, and the increased likelihood of leaks,
the need for rapid, coherent, and unified action by the executive is
even more critical today than it was in the 1970s. However,
Congress's role should be reestablished as the real, anticipated,
and constitutionally required check on the executive. If Congress
continues to play politics and never asserts itself, either through
legislation, declarations of war, modifications of existing laws, or
authorizations for force, the Judicial branch will continue the
solitary check on executive power. This trend is cause for concern
and it should be resisted. The new administration can change this
course by fostering an improved relationship with Congress,
where the legislature can be comfortable once again in asserting its
constitutionally mandated role.
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